Babak Zanjani and Abramovitching Iranian Political Culture / Abdollah Shahbazi
1. The incident took place on Tuesday, December 6, 2009, with the arrest of Reza Zarrab, a young Iranian businessman living in Turkey, and more than fifty related men, including the sons of the interior minister and two other Erdogan government ministers. , Began. The action was carried out by the Istanbul Police Organized Crime Unit, with the coordination of some judicial authorities, without the knowledge of Erdogan’s government. The next day, five senior police officers involved in the arrests were dismissed. Thus, the controversy of the Turkish state-owned Bank of the People’s Bank (People’s Bank) emerged.
Shortly thereafter, it became clear that the story of the People’s Bank was a blow to one of Iran’s major financial transfers networks, which in the four years amounted to € 5 billion, and that the Turkish state-owned bank would earn a profit of two billion dollars a year. has done. The incident marked the beginning of a major political crisis in Turkey, with its aftermath. In other words, the story of the People’s Bank had a dual function and targeted two goals, Iran and the Erdogan government.
Friday, December 5th, 2008 at 9:00 am I wrote:
“Now the matter is clear … there is a network that transfers money (in and out) to Iran and gets money. They have moved 87 billion euros over four years. That is, the volume of transfers amounted to € 5 billion, not whether the money was taken or eaten by anyone. Fethullah Gulen, identified by the Turkish police, hides from the Erdogan government and seizes the network to attack the Erdogan government. Erdogan, too, becomes angry and dismisses Gulen’s agents in the police. Right: Two billion dollars in profits annually lost to Halk Bank C (People’s Bank, State Bank of Turkey). Iran must also be angry because it has lost the main channel bypassing the financial sanctions. Previously AIPAC, the Israeli lobby, which knew the story, threatened to destroy the bank. In short, Gulen disrupted Turkey, eroded Erdogan’s reputation and possibly bankrupted the Turkish state bank.
The Bank of Turkey’s people’s controversy was still continuing, with the arrest of Babak Zanjani on Monday evening, December 5, 2009.
In critical situations, such as the revolution and the war, the emergence of a new class of wealthy Nokisas, who have attained enormous wealth through unhealthy political and economic relations, is commonplace.
In the Zersalsaran I spoke in detail about the Napoleonic Wars and the Rothschild network in the European continent and their huge profits in relation to the British Government and in their joint operations against Napoleon’s rule, “During this time, smuggling An important source of income for the Rothschilds was that they were making huge profits. The smugglers carried English goods to continental Europe and brought them to England for gold and silver. “The British government also supported these smugglers to break the Napoleonic sanctions.” In the book above, I called this phenomenon “one of the strangest and most complicated of the information-financial operations” “that crumbled the foundations of the Napoleonic Empire and laid the foundation for the largest and most extensive economic network in the contemporary world.”
This has been the case in Iran during the wars and political crises. For example, the Second World War in Iran, like in Europe, led to the emergence of a wealthy class of nosy. In his memoirs, Ain al-Saltanah has described this new class, or as he calls it, the “New Wheel Traders Party”:
“These new businessmen have come to terms with the fact that all the gardens around us [in Tajrish] have purchased multi-storey high-rise buildings. The days will pass by so all these villagers will become their property … These new merchants have grown up and are buying real estate without thinking [and] building mansions and opening up such gardens, houses, The property is like a grocery store. They used to pay … We used to never hear a million names in a business. Now that everyone is talking about billions. The merchants lived very simply, now you can be upscale. They each have two to three cars … These state monopolies and their government contracting work have brought them to this foundation. Those old traders who did not come in and did not forbid their property have the same old capital. The bidding or auctioning or bidding that the government, especially the railroad, would turn around, buy and sell … The tricks, the mischief in the members of the government were the key to selling the bunch and the privilege of bidding was not enough. They took the benefits, they took the government’s hat that makes people stupid … so no one will know their tricks and mischiefs. Contracting is the work of a party. In every cafe that spends a lot of money, it goes with the ladies, whether it’s the contractors, the young businessmen, or the office thieves … Gambling between these, feminine and masculine, is prevalent. “One night, fifteen or sixteen to thirty thousand tomans are lost and lost.”
2- During the thirty-five years of the Islamic Republic, some major political crises, and consequently economic ones, emerged that provided a favorable environment for the emergence and spread of organized corruption: confiscation of assets and unprofessionalism and extremism. In this regard, the US embassy in Tehran and its major financial repercussions – in particular the blocking of tens of billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the US and Europe, and the subsequent gradual confiscation of much of it with Western court rulings, Saddam’s military aggression and the Eighth War. Years and the needs arising from mass weapons purchases – the main part of which was only possible in specific ways, after Saddam’s oil embargo Praising Kuwait and turning Iran into the main conduit for Iraqi oil sales, the Iran-West nuclear dispute, and most importantly Iran’s long-running sanctions.
The aforementioned major crises, which have been going on for a long time, have led to the emergence and development of powerful networks that leverage and transact through covert financial-commercial operations and bring huge, unconventional profits. For example, during the imposed war, mafia networks in the West smuggled weapons, both in relation to Iran and Saddam’s government, and some centers by secretly supplying goods to Iran and selling Iranian oil to wealth. So great were their names on the list of the richest people in Britain. The internal networks of the aforementioned centers, including their agents in the administrative structure, and some Iranian political and economic agents in the West also became very wealthy.
If we use the word “contracting” not in the conventional sense (the contractor of all kinds) but the equivalent of rent-seekers who have been in the thick of the aforementioned crises for the past five years, we can still say the same thing today. Let us repeat:
“Contracting is the work of a party. “In any café that spends a lot of money going with the ladies, it must be either a contractor, a newcomer, or an administrative thief.”
2- Babak Zanjani is not a new phenomenon in contemporary Iranian history and in the thirty-five year history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Babak Zanjani is also not the richest member of the New Wheelers Party, as Ein al-Saltanah describes. If the names of some of the big speculators, who have gained enormous wealth through a combination of Iranian crises and are now recognized internationally, we will find that Babak Zanjani should only be considered one of the pinnacles of this mechanism. Height and crest are not prominent figures in this field.
However, from another angle, Babak Zanjani is a unique and unprecedented phenomenon in the thirty-five years of the Islamic Republic and even in the contemporary history of Iran. During the years of the constitutional revolutions and the first and second world wars and the crisis caused by the nationalization of the Babak oil industry, there were many Zanjanis, but none were willing to display wealth. The essence of this type of wealth is in conflict with the effect of selling. There are numerous examples of those who have accumulated wealth in contemporary Iranian history and to this day conceal the origin of their wealth and that of their families.
On December 5, at eleven o’clock in the afternoon, I wrote:
“Babak Zanjani was a factor in the chain of Iran’s efforts to circumvent sanctions; in this way, he became rich. They have not been the same; both during the war, during the period of heavy oil sanctions against Saddam’s regime after the invasion of Kuwait, and during the recent Iranian sanctions. It is natural that everyone will not get this position unless there is special communication. The big issue for me is the “show” that started with Babak Zanjani. The nature of such riches, and such riches, is secrecy. But in the case of Babak Zanjani, on the contrary, we saw the display of wealth. There was a deliberate attempt to refer to him as “Abramovich Iran”. He himself played an active role in the play. Two questions arise: First, to what extent was Babak Zanjani’s wealth real, and to what extent? Second, what were the goals of the “Abramovichi” project of Iranian political culture through Shu Babak Zanjani
The purpose of “Abramovitching Iranian Political Culture” is to present Babak Zanjani as the symbol of an organized economic mafia and to declare such an authoritative presence by a center that not only refuses to put forward itself but openly challenges all the principles and values of the Islamic Revolution. The demand and the process of eliminating the ideological shell are slipping.
Roman Abramovich, a wealthy six-year-old Jewish Jew in Russia, symbolizes the new class that gradually emerged within the Soviet Union, eventually removing the ideological shell and formalizing its former political structure. Today, the emerging mafia brokers within the Soviet Union take over most of the former Soviet republics, from Moscow to Baku and the Central Asian republics.
Babak Zanjani, 2, who even appears in appearance, resembles Abramovich, deliberately displays a networked authority within the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past three decades. Unlike his peers in the past, Babak Zanjani, instead of concealing his wealth, portrays it, if true, and even plays like Abramovich in blustery shows like buying a football club. (Abramovich bought England’s Chelsea club and Babak Zanjani’s railway club.) Babak Zanjani’s manners are not the usual behavior of big renters in contemporary Iranian history. From this point of view, Babak Zanjani is a completely unique and contemplative phenomenon. Babak Zanjani is a political project rather than an economic phenomenon.
1- Years ago, in a note entitled “Nostradamus’ Dream for Iran: Let’s Not Lessen the Risk of Bureaucratic Corruption!” (September 1, 2008) I wrote:
“It is true that bureaucratic corruption is natural in every society, but this” natural corruption “has certain dimensions and limits, and can no longer be considered” natural “. And when this corruption becomes “organized corruption” and based on the emergence of coherent and powerful mafia cells, we can no longer remain silent and indifferent to it