Egypt on the downhill / Sayed Morteza Miri
The demise of democracy and the rise of tyranny
in Egypt have become a perpetual trend. The people are not calm, and politics is a big challenge. A coup government that can in no way be stamped with legitimacy, and the president imprisoned, who is also deprived of the minimum rights of a prisoner, and the people who face each other and the consequence of this situation, naked security violence and victims Becoming those who are protesting the conditions. The violence that always comes from the security forces is, in fact, not the end of the protests and the violence, but the escalation of them and the promotion of atrocity by an official authority.
Those who ignored the consequences of undemocratic actions without expressing clear and rational demands by stonewalling the government resulting from free elections and abusing the government’s obvious mistakes paved the way for the rise of the military and military coup today. They have a frightening and depressing burden on their neck. Those who were threatened with ridiculous accusations of resigning and weakening the government after the formation of the coup government and realizing that it could not be stamped on legitimacy, soon realized that the path to prosperity in Egypt was not prosperous. Or those who are still tapping into the Second Revolution and have a presidential aspiration and have not realized that the revolution stole the Egyptian people, not the Muslim Brotherhood, but the army that returned water to the tyranny and abducted the Egyptian people. Hamdin Sabahi, who also allegedly ran in the presidential election, is now pursuing a position of sodomy after failing to physically and illegally eliminate his rivals in a democratic contest by the Egyptian people. He and his politicians alike show that what motivated them to join the popular protests against the Mubarak government and the army was not the pursuit of freedom and democracy, but the desire to seize power. However, one cannot easily overlook the hard mistakes of President Mohamed Morsi at sensitive camps.
Indeed, all groups are to blame for this situation. The defeated revolutionary groups in the election were outraged that they had given up the competition to the Muslim Brotherhood and had no tolerance for the Brotherhood. The Salafis, who strongly oppose democratic and soft readings of Islam, did not align with the Brotherhood and acted in concert with the opposition. Influential Western powers in Egypt, which have repeatedly proven to lack a proper analysis of Middle Eastern societies, continued to oppose the establishment of democratic Islamist governments and were not much in favor of the Brotherhood. The combination of all this and the coordination of domestic and foreign forces in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood even made Shari’ah benevolence, the Brotherhood’s most serious option, disqualified and excluded from the competition. However, the people voted for the Brotherhood’s second option, and Morsi came to power.
Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood also had strategic and sensitive errors. The law increasing the authority of the president was perhaps the most important strategic error of Mohamed Morsi. Some of these errors were, of course, those aimed at stonewalling government affairs and preventing the success of the government, but the best decision to remove these barriers to transparency with the people and politics was not made by Morsi.
And, of course, the other power influencing the Egyptian equation was the army. An army that had been Egypt’s premier political and economic power for many years, and since the fall of Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, had prevented the presidential election from reaching its full potential. An army that, with its many tools, had also seriously disrupted the activities of President Morsi’s government. The problems that were eliminated immediately after the coup and the formation of the coup government one after the other. The army cleverly expanded the space of discontent with the Morsi government so that the opposition could stage protests and move the situation into crisis. The expectations of opposition leaders have been so heightened that they each demand a new opposition leadership and a new presidency, so they do not accept the invitation of the government to negotiate and are less satisfied with the downfall of the president and the fall of the government. The clever army waited until the right time and then executed the final phase of the plan. The coup was carried out and the government fell to General Sisi and Adly Mansour. Representatives of two powerful Hosni Mubarak entities. The revolution was easily abducted by the former government and the army had a shrewd return to power, and in fact can be considered the greatest victor of the game.
The other winners of this dangerous game are the extremists and the fundamentalists who benefit most from the weakening of the position of the Islamists and make an unparalleled food for their lives. They have found unparalleled opportunity to reach out to Islamist masses and perhaps have never succeeded in instigating the inefficiency of democratic Islam against secularists in Egyptian society like today. An issue that could burn Egypt in the fire of fundamentalism and Islamophobia. And the main losers of this game are the Egyptian people, whether the Brotherhood supporters or opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood and all those who saw the painful treatment of Hosni Mubarak’s tyranny as a change of government and free elections because of what they know (Brotherhood supporters) and Whatever (those who call June 30 the Second Revolution), their project has long been in contention.
But the key question is that the rule of law protesters really could not manage without paying the heavy costs, the constant turmoil, pushing Egypt into the fray of internal groups and removing democratic gaps, and a comprehensive and conciliatory solution. National reach? Was the only way to deal with the government’s mistakes, lawlessness, assisting the coup, arresting the former president and the immediate arrest of the leaders and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood? And are the fundamentally violent clashes with a group that has come to power through a free election and that its incarceration and forced dissolution a democratic act in itself?
What is clear is the incorrect path that Egyptian politics pursued and led Egypt through the early democratization games that were easily resolvable to a path that suffered a bloody return to the past and a dictatorial militaristic system. . What was at stake in the decisions of Mohamed Morsi and the constitutional provisions of the time of Mohamed Morsi’s government were simply remedied by popular protests and Morsi’s invitation to negotiate and resort to the provisions provided for in that law.
Opposition to the government did not seem to believe that they had a significant popular base because the easiest way to get out of what they considered to be serious critics was to endure a maximum of four months and win the parliamentary elections and the impeachment and dismissal of the government. It was legal. While the Brotherhood’s opposition was not only that, but precisely in a completely contradictory spirit of legalism and democracy, they only sought to extradite the outlawed government.
Although some analysts or heads of opposition to Morsi tried to justify the actions taken in Egypt by means of concepts such as street democracy or democratic coups, such an apparent coup could not be whitewashed with these concepts and justifications today, and work here today. It is understood that Abdul Moneim Abul Fattouh, as a political figure, has no right to object to the changes in the name of the revolution, and the protesters also need to get permission from the police to hold a simple march. The same police and security forces who opened fire on them. The law, which Omar Moussa and the coup d’état see as guaranteeing human rights and individual and collective freedoms, has also brought Western allies to the coup.
Egypt will burn in the flames of great errors and tyranny, and the land of the pharaohs will experience another pharaoh. Pharaoh of Hosni Mubarak but much more alert and shrewd than him. But what the new rulers certainly do not succeed in is the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood from the social arena of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, good or bad, unhappy or unhappy, will not die in chains, and it will not be possible to remove this trend like all other intellectual currents from the Egyptian political and social scene